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2017-02-20_Presentatie_Commentaar_op_het_onderzoek_Woldemp_Werk_voor_ouderen_in_Belgie

Werk voor ouderen in België: werkt het beleid? Commentaar op onderzoek ‘WOLDEMP’ Onderzoeksvoormiddag 20 2 2017 Frank Vandenbroucke Universiteit van Amsterdam Een voorbeeld wetenschappelijke beleidsevaluatie Het Generatiepact: much ado about nothing? Twee algemene bedenkingen… … en een punctuele kritiek alternatief: flexibel pensioenstelsel Selectieve lastenverminderingen pensioenbonus revisited Interessante macro-analyse: oorzaken? Symbolische inzet versus eindresultaat ‘Aanmoedigende maatregelen’ vs ‘Beperkende Bv ! Inkomenseffect geldt ook onbeperkt bijverdienen bij pensioen mogelijke factor onderschatting: geleidelijk wijzigende beeldvorming als amplifier (Is stereotype correct?) De rol stereotypering ‘statistische discriminatie’ ‘Pedagogie door beleid’ 1: goede voorbeelden wijzigen de (impact foute stereotypering: wijzigt) 2: gedragingen inzake investering menselijk kapitaal via correcte realiteit Indien productiviteitskloof inconvenient truth is: Stereotypering is (deels) correct (bij ongewijzigd gedrag): hebben geen impact Op terrein zullen nieuwe uitstap-formules ontstaan (ziekte; maar riskeert uitstap-formule te worden): kosten-productiviteitswig blijft dus cruciaal Waarom meer transitie naar rustpensioen vanuit tijdskrediet? Gewijzigde voorkeuren werknemer/perceptie werkgever Financiële incentives: “Stel dat voltijdse werknemer bruto maandelijks €2000 verdient voltijds recht geeft 60% dit bedrag namelijk €1200 halftijdse tijdskrediet €1000 euro plus €400 uitkering samen €1400 Deze echter verhouding tot arbeidsinkomen (de zogenaamde “vervangingsratio”) stijgt hierdoor ongeveer 86% = (1200/1400)*100% In vergelijking met heeft bijgevolg relatief groter financieel voordeel om stoppen werken gaan dan ” Individuen verschillende voorkeuren: creëer ruime keuzemogelijkheden inclusief deeltijds pensioen… vereist actuariële correcties die sociaal billijk zijn omdat ze loopbaangevoelig zijn; tweevoudig verschil tijdskrediet: gelijkstelling; correcties; klassieke opvatting over Gemiddelde pensioenen moeten voldoende genereus PS Kosten-batenanalyse? Welvaartsanalyses rekening houden (uiteenlopende) vrije tijd/inkomen Lastenverminderingen klemtoon leggen lage lonen Zolang er kloof tussen kost oudere werknemers hun productiviteit creëert elk uitstapstelsel risico ‘dumping’ Uitstapregelingen moéten gepaard maatregelen kost/productiviteit gunstig beïnvloeden Pensioenbonus (versie regering Di Rupo) was verstandige manier gemiddelde verbeteren zonder ongunstig invloed arbeidsmotivatie; moet aangevuld billijke ‘malus’ mits hoge Pensioenhervorming werf… www frankvandenbroucke uva nl

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UTwente_Vandenbroucke_21.11.2016

The social significance of the European Union: between naïve optimism and doom-mongering
Frank Vandenbroucke University of Amsterdam
University of Twente – Week van de Inspiratie 21 November 2016
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
Inequality in Europe
US
Median income US states (US ‘representative state’ = 1)
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Median income EU Member States (EU ‘representative MS’ = 1)
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)?
European income distribution: a moving scale
Romania Denmark
Top quintile 4 32% 133%
Top quintile 3 30% 140%
Top quintile 2 28% 145%
Top quintile 1 23% 152%
Minimum wages and what governments can do: net disposable income of couple with 2 children, one minimum-wage earner
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Source: CSB/MIPI
Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 6 0 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity Work intensity of the household Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 60 50 40 30 20 10 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity Work intensity of the household Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 ‘Poverty stabilisation’: the contribution of transfers (not pensions) in the reduction of poverty 30 25 20 15 10 2004-06 2012 Source: Eurostat, own calculation of ‘poverty reduction by transfers (excl. pensions)’, total population, SILC 2005-2007 en SILC 2013 The social dimension of the European project according to the founding fathers: a belief in convergence • European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union) • Division of labour: – economic development: supranational coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational – social development: national sovereignty (in theory) • The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008. • A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)? • Design flaws in the European project Macro-economic stabilisation: smoothing of economic shocks: US vs. EMU 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% US: - Federal tax-and-benefit system - State-based unemployment insurance with federal framework & extensions Saving Net taxes and transfers Factor income and capital depreciation Total smoothed US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010 Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper EMU: stability, sovereignty and solidarity • Why are stabilization instruments centralized in monetary unions? – Risk sharing (pooling) Externalities (vaccination) • Paradox: in the US, solidarity systems at the state level are weak, but they are supported by solidarity mechanisms at the federal level; the EU is not ready to support strong mechanisms of solidarity at the member state level by solidarity at the EU level. • Puzzle of: – Binding agreements sovereignty – Distrust solidarity – Legitimate concern about moral hazard, which has become an obsession Defining the EMU’s social objective is a necessity rather than a luxury • EMU forces upon the member states : – a shared conception of labour market flexibility – symmetric guidelines on wage cost competitiveness & institutions that can deliver – long term: sustainability of pensions • Any ‘Eurozone re-insurance’ of ‘national stabilization policies presupposes (a) minimum requirements w.r.t. the adequacy of national unemployment insurance and the concomitant labour market regulation; and (b) general trust in the quality of each other’s social fabric. • The need for conceptual clarity: a European Social Union ≠ a European Welfare State Reciprocity in the EU • Mutual insurance is based on reciprocity • Reconciling domestic social cohesion and free movement should also be based on reciprocity – Non-discrimination posting of workers – … need for a consistent approach A European Social Union A Social Union would • support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (e.g. stabilization, fair corporate taxation, minimum wages) • guide the substantive development of national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational definition of ‘the European social model’. European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose, pursuing both national and pan-European social cohesion based on reciprocity A European Pillar of Social Rights: arguments & caveats • A basic consensus about the general features of the ‘social order’ that is associated with the Monetary Union is a necessity; the EPSR can contribute to such a consensus. • Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a combination of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian background conditions and social protection, as embodied in the EPSR. • Caveat: perception of ‘replay’ of earlier soft initiatives will backlash Thank you 1) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7, European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf) 2) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) 3) Vandenbroucke, Automatic Stabilisers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Insitute, Tribune, September 2016 (www.delorsinstitute.eu) 4) Furceri, D. en A. Zdziencicka, The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism ?, IMF Working Paper 13/198, 2013 5) Beblavy, M., G. Marconi en I. Maselli, A European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The rationale and the challenges ahead, CEPS Special Report No. 119, 2015 6) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Inaugural Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 1 June 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl 7) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot UK, 2015, pp. 489-520. www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

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Presentatie-ProDemos_11.10.2016

Europa’s nieuwe strijd: sociaal
beleid voor allen?
Frank Vandenbroucke ProDemos
Den Haag, 11 oktober 2016
Het ongelijke Europa
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Mediaan inkomen staten (t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
0,6
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Mediaan inkomen lidstaten (t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000 niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000 niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma? Leidt internationale integratie onvermijdelijk tot ongelijkheid?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000 niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
Een tragisch dilemma?
– Constructiefouten in de muntunie
• In een muntunie moeten stabiliseringsmechanismen centraal georganiseerd worden
• Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met solidariteit op het EU niveau
• Puzzel van:
– Bindende afspraken soevereiniteit
– Wantrouwen solidariteit
– Fobie voor ‘moral hazard’ (misbruik), die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken
• Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is noodzakelijk
• Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
• Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is noodzakelijk
• Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
• Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit:
– non-discriminatie detachering
– kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten?
Een Europese Sociale Unie:
ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie)
• oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten ligt;
• op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model.
Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten
Wederkerigheid als basis om beleidsvermogen te heroveren www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl
1) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Oratie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1 Juni 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl
2) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7, European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf)
3) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/)
4) Vandenbroucke, Automatic Stabilisers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Insitute, Tribune, September 2016 (www.delorsinstitute.eu)
5) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot UK, 2015, pp. 489-520.
www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

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MAES_Vandenbroucke_24.10.2016

Social policy in a monetary union: puzzles, paradoxes and perspectives
Frank Vandenbroucke University of Amsterdam
MAES lectures ‘Transnational and global perspectives on Europe’ Leuven, 24 October 2016
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
Inequality in Europe
Median income US states (US ‘representative state’ = 1)
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Median income EU Member States (EU ‘representative MS’ = 1)
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)?
European income distribution: a moving scale
Romania Denmark
Top quintile 4 32% 133%
Top quintile 3 30% 140%
Top quintile 2 28% 145%
Top quintile 1 23% 152%
Minimum wages and what governments can do: net disposable income of couple with 2 children, one minimum-wage earner
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Source: CSB/MIPI
Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 60 50 40 30 20 10 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity Work intensity of the household Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity Work intensity of the household Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 ‘Poverty stabilisation’: the contribution of transfers (not pensions) in the reduction of poverty 30 20 15 10 5 0 2004-06 2012 Source: Eurostat, own calculation of ‘poverty reduction by transfers (excl. pensions)’, total population, SILC 2005-2007 en SILC 2013 The social dimension of the European project according to the founding fathers: a belief in convergence • European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union) • Division of labour: – economic development: supranational – coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational social development: national sovereignty (in theory) • The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008. • A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)? • Design flaws in the European project Macro-economic stabilisation: smoothing of economic shocks: US vs. EMU 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% US: - Federal tax-and-benefit system - State-based unemployment insurance with federal framework & extensions Saving Net taxes and transfers Factor income and capital depreciation Total smoothed 0% US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010 Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper EMU: stability, sovereignty and solidarity • Why are stabilization instruments centralized in monetary unions? – Risk sharing (pooling) – Externalities (vaccination) • Paradox: in the US, solidarity systems at the state level are weak, but they are supported by solidarity mechanisms at the federal level; the EU is not ready to support strong mechanisms of solidarity at the member state level by solidarity at the EU level. • Puzzle of: – Binding agreements sovereignty – Distrust solidarity – Legitimate concern about moral hazard, which has become an obsession Defining the EMU’s social objective is a necessity rather than a luxury • EMU forces upon the member states : – a shared conception of labour market flexibility – symmetric guidelines on wage cost competitiveness & institutions that can deliver – long term: sustainability of pensions • Any ‘Eurozone re-insurance’ of ‘national stabilization policies presupposes (a) minimum requirements w.r.t. the adequacy of national unemployment insurance and the concomitant labour market regulation; and (b) general trust in the quality of each other’s social fabric. • The need for conceptual clarity: a European Social Union ≠ a European Welfare State Reciprocity in the EU • Mutual insurance is based on reciprocity • Reconciling domestic social cohesion and free movement should also be based on reciprocity – Non-discrimination posting of workers – … need for a consistent approach A European Social Union A Social Union would • support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (e.g. stabilization, fair corporate taxation, minimum wages) • guide the substantive development of national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational definition of ‘the European social model’. European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose, pursuing both national and pan-European social cohesion based on reciprocity European Pillar of Social Rights: arguments & caveats • A basic consensus about the general features of the ‘social order’ that is associated with the Monetary Union is a necessity; the EPSR can contribute to such a consensus. Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a combination of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian background conditions and social protection, as embodied in the EPSR. • Caveat: perception of ‘replay’ of earlier soft initiatives will backlash Thank you 1) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7, European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf) 2) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) 3) Vandenbroucke, Automatic Stabilisers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Insitute, Tribune, September 2016 (www.delorsinstitute.eu) 4) Furceri, D. en A. Zdziencicka, The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism ?, IMF Working Paper 13/198, 2013 5) Beblavy, M., G. Marconi en I. Maselli, A European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The rationale and the challenges ahead, CEPS Special Report No. 119, 2015 6) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Inaugural Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 1 June 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl 7) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot UK, 2015, pp. 489-520. www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

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Flexibility_reform_proposals_CPR_Vandenbroucke_EAPSPI_21-10-2016_draft

Flexibility in the reform proposal of the Belgian
Commission on Pension Reform 2020-2040
Frank Vandenbroucke University of Amsterdam
EAPSPI Conference Leuven, 21.10.2016
Structure of the presentation
• The Belgian Commission on Pension Reform 2020-2040: ‘defined ambition’
• Fair flexibility in pension systems
• Actuarial corrections and the social stratification of longevity
UN CONTRAT SOCIAL PERFORMANT ET FIABLE
Commission de Réforme des Pensions 2020-2040
Propositions pour une réforme structurelle des régimes de pension
www.pension2040.belgique.be
• Pensions = managing uncertainty
– by integrating adjustment mechanisms in the pension system
– EU Commission: by indexing parameters of pension systems to longevity (e.g. career requirements & retirement age)
• ‘Conditional certainty’ for the individual citizen
(Musgrave Rule)
– Conditional on macro demographic & economic context
– Conditional on individual choice
• Pension = (number of points) x (value of point)
x (actuarial corrections)
x (indexation to income growth)
• Pension = (number of points) x (value of point)
x (actuarial corrections)
x (indexation to income growth)
• Number of points <= career • Pension = (number of points) x (value of point) x (actuarial corrections) x (indexation to income growth) • Number of points <= career • Value of point ≈ f (average income employed) Premised on a desirable and sustainable replacement rate for a ‘standard worker’ with a ‘normal career’; normal career’ takes into account changes in demography etc. • Pension = (number of points) x (value of point) x (actuarial corrections) x (indexation to income growth) • Number of points <= career • Value of point ≈ f (average income employed) Premised on a desirable and sustainable replacement rate for a ‘standard worker’ with a ‘normal career’ (‘reference career’); ‘reference career’ takes into account changes in demography etc. • Positive / negative corrections ≈ f (career), given social stratification of age of entry and healthy life years • Pension = (number of points) x (value of point) x (actuarial corrections) x (indexation to income growth) • Number of points <= career • Value of point ≈ f (average income employed) Premised on a desirable and sustainable replacement rate for a ‘standard worker’ with a ‘normal career’; ‘normal career’ takes into account changes in demography etc. • Positive / negative corrections ≈ f (career) • Indexation ≈ f (growth real incomes), can be an adjustment variable Two objectives: • Target replacement rate for ‘standard worker’ with ‘reference career’ & stabilisation of income ratio pensioners/employed • Stabilisation of the contribution rates on earned income Two objectives: • Target replacement rate for ‘standard worker’ with ‘normal career’ & stabilisation of average income ratios pensioners/employed • Stabilisation of the contribution rates on earned income Postponing retirement [Adjustments w.r.t. indexation of pensions] [Adjustments w.r.t. funding] Two objectives: Target replacement rate for ‘standard worker’ with ‘normal career’ & stabilisation of average income ratios pensioners/employed • Stabilisation of the contribution rates on earned income Postponing retirement [Adjustments w.r.t. indexation of pensions] [Adjustments w.r.t. funding] • The Belgian Commission on Pension Reform 2020-2040: ‘defined ambition’ • Fair flexibility in pension systems • Actuarial corrections and the social stratification of longevity • Statutory pension age, a possible scenario studied by CPR 2016 2060 Age Career Age Career Statutory pension age 65 0 67 0 Early retirement 60 42 62 44 40 41 • The need for additional flexibility: partial pensions • Partial retirement conditioned by previous & current employment? (or, ‘decoupling’?) • Limits on the combination of pension income and earnings? • Accumulation of additional pension rights when combining pension income and employment? • Which actuarial corrections? • Existing schemes were nested in labour market regulation and employment contracts; they originated in reforms of the first generations of early exit schemes (‘preretirement’) & moves towards ‘transitional labour markets’ • Eurofound, 2016: Extending working lives through flexible retirement schemes: Partial Retirement • “Partial retirement” = schemes that facilitate reduced working hours by providing a partial pension or a (non-pension) benefit close to the statutory pension age • “Over half of the EU Member States and Norway have national or sector-level partial retirement schemes. The schemes vary in rationale, coverage and design. Partial retirement can enable and motivate people to continue working up to the statutory pension age and beyond. Almost two- thirds of EU citizens say it appeals more to them to combine a part-time job and partial pension than to fully retire. However, no scheme was identified that unambiguously extended working lives for all participants. Partial retirement may have extended working lives for specific groups, especially people with health problems, disabilities, care responsibilities and physically or mentally demanding jobs. On the aggregate level, though, the reduction in hours facilitated by partial retirement has frequently outweighed the increase in hours arising from lengthening the working lives of some participants.” • “Even when partial retirement does not extend working lives, it may have been negotiated as an alternative to early retirement schemes that would have reduced working lives even further.” • “… policymakers may also consider the impact on quality of life and society: flexibility allows closer alignment of the retirement path with workers’ preferences, and can facilitate volunteering activities and care commitments.” • “Low-paid workers may more often need a reduction of working hours to extend their working lives but are often unable to afford it even if wage loss is partly compensated.” • “Several of the schemes were used more by higher socioeconomic groups, which raises concerns about fairness, particularly if schemes are publicly funded.” • “It may be unfair if schemes are not accessible to older people who already work reduced hours (many of whom are women) or to unemployed or inactive people who start working part time.” • “Employers may use involuntary partial retirement to restructure their workforce, but partial retirement schemes have also sometimes prevented unemployment.” “Decoupled systems”: people can draw a partial pension from a certain age regardless of the number of hours they work e.g. Czech Republic, Finalnd, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Dutch public sector scheme • “Low-paid workers may more often need a reduction of working hours to extend their working lives but are often unable to afford it even if wage loss is partly compensated.” • “Several of the schemes were used more by higher socioeconomic groups, which raises concerns about fairness, particularly if schemes are publicly funded.” • “It may be unfair if schemes are not accessible to older people who already work reduced hours (many of whom are women) or to unemployed or inactive people who start working part time.” • “Employers may use involuntary partial retirement to restructure their workforce, but partial retirement schemes have also sometimes prevented unemployment.” “Decoupled systems”: people can draw a partial pension from a certain age regardless of the number of hours they work e.g. Czech Republic, Finalnd, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Dutch public sector scheme • Partial retirement conditioned by previous & current employment? (or, ‘decoupling’?) • Limits on the combination of pension income and earnings? • Accumulation of additional pension rights when combining pension income and employment? • Which actuarial corrections? • Partial retirement conditioned by previous & current employment? (or, ‘decoupling’?) • Limits on the combination of pension income and earnings? • Accumulation of additional pension rights when combining pension income and employment? • Which actuarial corrections? • The Belgian Commission on Pension Reform 2020-2040: ‘defined ambition’ • Fair flexibility in pension systems • Actuarial corrections and the social stratification of longevity • Longevity is socially stratified • This stratification correlates with education, i.e. with the age of entry into the labour market • We define a non-uniform ‘normal pension age’: the age of entry into the labour market + the ‘reference career’ • We define a non-uniform ‘normal pension age’: the age of entry into the labour market + the ‘reference career’ • If retirement before the ‘normal pension age’: negative correction is applied • If retirement after the ‘normal pension age’: positive correction is applied N : reference career (identical for all, but evolving over time) x(0,i) : age of entry into the labour market for individual i x(r,i) : ‘normal age of retirement’ for individual i x(r,i) = x(0,i) + N coefficient conversion = • The Belgian Commission on Pension Reform 2020-2040: ‘defined ambition’ • Fair flexibility in pension systems • Actuarial corrections and the social stratification of longevity • Requires large consensus • Based on sense of common purpose: defined ambition www.pension2040.belgique.be www.pensioen2040.belgie.be Report of June 2014 Complementary report on flexibility of April 2015

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Ecfin_fellowship_conference_28.11.2016_Structural-convergence-versus-systems-competition

Structural convergence versus systems
competition: the case of social policies in EMU
Frank Vandenbroucke
Ecfin Annual Research Conference 28.11.2016
• What is the extent of ‘social diversity’ (diversity in social models) that can be accommodated in EMU?
• Why a ‘Eurozone Pillar of Social Rights’?
Arguments for ‘structural social convergence’ vs. ‘social systems competition’
i. Requirements w.r.t. economic symmetry in a monetary union
ii. Requirements w.r.t. labour market flexibility and worker mobility in a monetary union;
iii. Consequences of risk-sharing solutions in the context of a monetary union;
iv. Externalities of national policies in the context of a monetary union;
v. Subsidiarity and the national/regional/local capacity for policy innovation;
vi. The need for mutual trust between Member States
De Grauwe and Ji, Flexibility and Stability. A difficult trade-off in the Eurozone, CEPS Working Document 422, April 2016
Permanent shocks dominate Business cycle dominates
De Grauwe and Ji, Flexibility and Stability. A difficult trade-off in the Eurozone, CEPS Working Document 422, April 2016
• Structural social convergence linked to requirements of symmetry
• Coordination of wage policies & capacity to deliver
• Structural social convergence linked to risk-sharing (to mitigate institutional moral hazard in the case of risk-sharing):
• Minimum requirements w.r.t. ‘stabilisation quality’ of unemployment regulation;
• Minimum requirements w.r.t. ‘activation quality’ of unemployment regulation.
• Structural social convergence linked to flexibility as ‘adaptability’ to permanent shocks
Dolls, Fuest, Peichl, Automatic Stabilisation and Discretionary Fiscal Policy in the financial crisis, 2012.

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Pillar_Social_Rights_Seminar_Work-Welfare-Inequalities_10.10.2016_Vandenbroucke

A European Pillar of Social Rights
Potential and caveats
Frank Vandenbroucke
University of Amsterdam
Seminar on Work, Welfare and Inequalities in Europe
Brussels, 10 October 2016
A basic consensus on the social objectives of EMU/EU is a
necessity…
• … for the EU to be a union of well-functioning welfare states
(social & economic stabilization; upward convergence)
• Arguments related to EMU
• Arguments related to EU28 (now 27)
• A European Pillar of Social Rights: potential & caveats
Social and economic stabilization: the contribution of transfers
(not pensions) in the reduction of poverty
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2004-06 2012
Inadequate welfare states
Austerity & problem of stabilization Erosion of mature welfare states ?
Source: Eurostat, own calculation of ‘poverty reduction by transfers (excl. pensions)’, total population, SILC
2005-2007 en SILC 2013
A basic consensus on the social objectives of EMU is a necessity
• The problem of stabilization => any ‘Eurozone re-insurance’ of national
stabilization policies presupposes (a) minimum requirements w.r.t. the
adequacy of national unemployment insurance and the concomitant
labour market regulation; and (b) general trust in the quality of each
other’s social fabric.
• More generally, EMU forces upon the member states :
– a shared conception of labour market flexibility (and , hence, security)
– symmetric guidelines on wage cost competitiveness (e.g. ‘golden rule’ linking
wages to productivity) & institutions that can deliver (importance of coordinated
collective bargaining)
– long term: sustainability of pensions
• The need for conceptual clarity: a European Social Union ≠ a European
Welfare State
Arguments related to EU28 (now 27)
• An inevitability of European Monetary Union;
• Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a combination
of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian background conditions
and social protection
• Freedom of movement and national social cohesion in EU: a
‘balancing act’ is possible, based on sound and consistent principles
– Non-discrimination of mobile workers / delineated role for posting
– ‘Social dumping’ related to mobility: also depends on domestic labour
market regulation
– Economic freedoms  right to strike (Viking, Laval)European
A European Pillar of Social Rights: arguments
• A basic consensus about the general features of the ‘social
order’ that is associated with the Monetary Union is a
necessity; the EPSR can contribute to such a consensus.
• Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a
combination of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian
background conditions and social protection, as embodied in
the EPSR.
• Cross-border mobility must be embedded in employment
relations of sufficient quality: a role for EPSR
A European Pillar of Social Rights: caveats
• The expression ‘rights’ creates expectations
• If the perception is that the EPSR is a ‘replay’ of earlier initiatives based on soft coordination,
the initiative will frustrate expectations and backlash
• There is a need both for social benchmarking and for a legislative agenda; two relationships
are to be clarified:
– The relation between the EPSR and the new social benchmarking initiative announced by the
Commission in its Work Programme 2016 and its Communication of 21.10.2015 on the follow-up of
the Five Presidents’ Report
– The relation between the EPSR and the legal acquis in domains in which the EU has legislative
competences
• A link is needed with the ‘hard’ agenda on the completion of EMU, notably the case for a
Eurozone stabilization capacity (cf. supra, ‘re-insurance’ and minimum requirements)
• The EPSR should be discussed and consolidated at the highest political level (cf. the political
salience of the Fiscal Compact)
Resources
1) Vandenbroucke, Automatic stabilizers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Tribune,
Notre Europe Institut Jacques Delors, 22 September 2016
(http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/stabiliserssocialeurope-vandenbroucke-jdisept16.pdf?pdf=ok)
2) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and
cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways
forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/)
3) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of
Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot
UK, 2015, pp. 489-520.
4) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7,
European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf)
5) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Inaugural
Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 1 June 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl
www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

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Kind-en-Gezin_Toekomst_is_Jong_Vandenbroucke_6.10.2016

Beschouwingen bij ‘De Toekomst is Jong’
Frank Vandenbroucke
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Conferentie ‘De Toekomst is Jong’
Kind en Gezin, 6 oktober 2016
Structuur van de presentatie
• Focus op kinderen en hun – ongelijke – omgeving
• Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Kansarmoede in Vlaanderen
• Harde knelpunten
• Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Nood aan concretisering
Structuur van de presentatie
• Focus op kinderen en hun – ongelijke – omgeving
• Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Kansarmoede in Vlaanderen
• Harde knelpunten
• Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Nood aan concretisering
Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Gelijke kansen scheppen  gelijke resultaten verzekeren
• Universele voorzieningen  selectieve voorzieningen
• Materiële tekorten  immateriële tekorten
OESO: kansen en resultaten, vicieuze cirkels van ongelijkheid
Gemiddelde vaardigheid in wiskunde, in functie van
onderwijsachtergrond ouders (PEB) en inkomensongelijkheid in de
samenleving
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
0,18 0,23 0,28 0,33 0,38
Vaardigheid wiskunde
Ongelijkheid in de samenleving (Gini )
Low PEB Medium PEB High PEB
OECD, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits Us All, Paris, 2015, p. 28
WHO (Marmot Review, 2013): ‘de oorzaken van de oorzaken’
• Sociale ongelijkheid inzake gezondheid is groot
• “One response … is to ensure universal coverage of health
care. Another is to focus on behavior – smoking, diet, and
alcohol – that cause much of these health inequities but are
also socially determined. The review endorses both of these
responses. But the review recommendations extend further –
to the causes of the causes: the conditions in which people
are born, grow, live, work and age and inequities in power,
money and resources that give rise to them.”
WHO (Marmot Review, 2013): proportioneel universalisme
• Marmot Review “There is a social gradient in health : health is progressively
better the higher the socioeconomic position of people and communities. It is
important to design policies that act across the whole gradient and to address
the people at the bottom of the social gradient and the people who are most
vulnerable. To achieve both these objectives, policies are needed that are
universal but are implemented at a level and intensity of action that is
proportionate to need – proportionate universalism.”
• Jong en Gezond: “We stellen een aanpak voor welke toepasbaar is voor alle
zwangeren, kinderen en hun ouders (universele aanpak) maar waarbij de
intensiteit van de ondersteuning en de wijze waarop die geboden wordt sterk
kan variëren naargelang de ondersteuningsnood van de zwangere, het kind
en/of de ouders (proportionalisme). Voor zeer specifieke doelgroepen kunnen
additionele programma’s worden voorzien.”
Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Gelijke kansen scheppen  gelijke resultaten verzekeren
• Universele voorzieningen  selectieve voorzieningen
• Materiële tekorten  immateriële tekorten
Het is mogelijk vicieuze cirkels te doorbreken…
• Marmot review: “Evidence shows that high-quality early years
services, with effects on parenting, can compensate for the effects
of social disadvantage on early child development. Given the nature
of early childhood, the services that support this stage of life are
intergenerational and multiprofessional, include health, education
and social welfare and are aimed at parents as well as children.”
• Peter Adriaenssens: “De effecten van armoede zijn omkeerbaar
door stimulatie, door steun aan het gezin, door een buurt rond het
gezin waar burgers kwetsbaarheid respecteren en niet als etiket
hanteren dat uitsluiting meebrengt. De vertraging in ontwikkeling
kan dus terug aangezwengeld worden, en dat des te meer als vroeg
met de gepaste stimulatie begonnen wordt. Als we alle ouders, ook
de zwakke, kunnen ondersteunen in hun nestvorming, dan hoeft
armoede niet noodzakelijk te betekenen dat de capaciteiten van
hun kinderen in de knop geknakt worden.”
Het is mogelijk vicieuze cirkels te doorbreken…
• Marmot review: “Evidence shows that high-quality early years
services, with effects on parenting, can compensate for the effects
of social disadvantage on early child development. Given the nature
of early childhood, the services that support this stage of life are
intergenerational and multiprofessional, include health, eduation
and social welfare and are aimed at parents as well as children.”
• Peter Adriaenssens: “De effecten van armoede zijn omkeerbaar
door stimulatie, door steun aan het gezin, door een buurt rond het
gezin waar burgers kwetsbaarheid respecteren en niet als etiket
hanteren dat uitsluiting meebrengt. De vertraging in ontwikkeling
kan dus terug aangezwengeld worden, en dat des te meer als vroeg
met de gepaste stimulatie begonnen wordt. Als we alle ouders, ook
de zwakke, kunnen ondersteunen in hun nestvorming, dan hoeft
armoede niet noodzakelijk te betekenen dat de capaciteiten van
hun kinderen in de knop geknakt worden.”
Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Gelijke kansen scheppen  gelijke resultaten verzekeren
• Universele voorzieningen  selectieve voorzieningen
• Materiële tekorten  immateriële tekorten
Europese Commissie (2013): een sterke aanbeveling
• Sociaal investeringspakket
• Aanbeveling: ‘Investeren in kinderen: de vicieuze cirkel van
achterstand doorbreken’
o Toegang tot arbeidsmarkt en werk dat loont voor ouders
o Betaalbare en goede kinderopvang
o Inkomensondersteuning door kinderbijslag, herverdeling…
o Kwaliteit van en toegang tot sociale dienstverlening,
gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, huisvesting…
o Betrokkenheid van kinderen zelf (rechten)
Structuur van de presentatie
• Focus op kinderen en hun – ongelijke – omgeving
• Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Kansarmoede in Vlaanderen
• Harde knelpunten
• Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Nood aan concretisering
Kind en Gezin: kansarmoede neemt toe
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2010 2015
niet-Belg en kansarm
Belg en kansarm
niet-Belg en nietkansarm
Belg en niet-kansarm
‘Verharding’: inkomen, werk & opleiding domineren
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inkomen
Arbeid
Opleiding
Huisvesting
Ontwikkeling
Gezondheid
Tekorten inzake werk èn scholing versterken elkaar
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Laag-VL Mid-VL Hoog-VL Laag-EU15 Mid-EU15 Hoog-EU15
Materiële deprivatie (3 items)
Werkintensiteit van het huishouden
Deprivatierisico [0-17] laaggeschoolde ouders
Deprivatierisico [0-17] middengeschoolde ouders
Deprivatierisico [0-17] hooggeschoolde ouders
Berekening: Julie Vinck, CSB, UA, SILC 2011
Harde knelpunten
• Inkomensbeleid (nettoloon bij werk, werkloosheidsuitkeringen, leefloon,
kinderbijslag…) en tariefbeleid
• Werk voor laaggeschoolden: nood aan een nieuwe beleidsdynamiek
• Onderwijs
o Kleuterparticipatie: inschrijving, maar vooral: aanwezigheid; rol van scholen,
LOP’s, K&G, lokale overheden…
o Overgangen
o Onderwijshervorming en ongekwalificeerde uitstroom
o Differentiële financiering werkingsmiddelen scholen
o Lange schoolvakanties
o …
Structuur van de presentatie
• Focus op kinderen en hun – ongelijke – omgeving
• Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Kansarmoede in Vlaanderen
• Harde knelpunten
• Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Nood aan concretisering
Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Jong en overal thuis:
o “Zowel de kwaliteit van de fysieke ruimte en de sociale leefomgeving als van de
basisvoorzieningen voor jonge kinderen en hun gezin bepalen in grote mate hoe rijk of arm de
ontplooiingskansen van kinderen zijn.”
o “Vlaanderen heeft verschillende basisvoorzieningen voor kinderen en hun gezinnen
(basisonderwijs, preventieve gezinsondersteuning, jeugdwerk…): we beschouwen de nauwe
samenwerking tussen voorzieningen en diensten voor kinderen en gezinnen in een wijkgericht
netwerk ook als een basisvoorziening.”
o “… intense samenwerking in een wijkgericht netwerk…”
• Voorwaarden voor succes:
o Centraal beleid moet sterk zijn in elk domein (kinderopvang, onderwijs, …)
o Centraal beleid moet aandacht hebben voor transities
o Lokaal beleid moet ‘op het terrein’ gaan
o Lokaal beleid heeft middelen nodig
o Lokaal beleid moet kunnen leren uit wederzijdse ervaringen
o Lokaal beleid moet echt kunnen regisseren (cf. Filip De Rynck)
Lokaal beleidsvermogen is cruciaal
Structuur van de presentatie
• Focus op kinderen en hun – ongelijke – omgeving
• Drie foute tegenstellingen
• Kansarmoede in Vlaanderen
• Harde knelpunten
• Lokaal verbindingsbeleid
• Nood aan concretisering
Beloftevolle maar te concretiseren beleidsvoorstellen
• Jong en gezond schetst hoe een ‘universeel generiek zorgpad’ voor
alle (aanstaande) ouders en kinderen tot de leeftijd van 6 er zou
kunnen uitzien, en hoe dit geïntensifieerd kan worden (o.b.v.
richtlijn KCE, consultschema K&G, consultschema CLB…)
• Te concretiseren:
o rol en profiel van een ‘perinatale zorgcoördinator’…
o … en het netwerk dat haar/hem ondersteunt (Huizen van het Kind?
Lokale multidisciplinaire netwerken?)
o inkanteling in de reguliere gezondheidszorg (transities!)
o inbreng van de federale ziekteverzekering (o.m. betaalbaarheid, maar
ook financiering actoren)

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FESSUD_conference_Vandenbroucke_28.9.2016

A European Social Union.
Unduly idealistic or inevitable?
Frank Vandenbroucke
University of Amsterdam
FESSUD Conference
28 September 2016
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic
progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the
gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries
(through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration?
• Design flaws in the European project?
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic
progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the
gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries
(through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)?
• Design flaws in the European project?
Minimum wages and what governments can do: net disposable
income of couple with 2 children, one minimum-wage earner
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Erosion of welfare states? Changing composition of households? More precarious jobs? Migration? Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 The social dimension of the European project according to the founding fathers: a belief in convergence • European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union) • Division of labour: – economic development: supranational – coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational – social development: national sovereignty (in theory) • The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008. • A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)? • Design flaws in the European project? Macro-economic stabilisation: smoothing of economic shocks: US vs. EMU -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010 Saving Net taxes and transfers Factor income and capital depreciation Total smoothed US: - Federal tax-and-benefit system - State-based unemployment insurance with federal framework & extensions Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper EMU: stability, sovereignty and solidarity • Why are stabilization instruments centralized in monetary unions? – Risk sharing (pooling) – Externalities (vaccination) • Paradox: in the US, solidarity systems at the state level are weak, but they are supported by solidarity mechanisms at the federal level; the EU is not ready to support strong mechanisms of solidarity at the member state level by solidarity at the EU level. • Puzzle of: – Binding agreements  sovereignty – Distrust  solidarity – Legitimate concern about moral hazard, which has become an obsession Defining the EMU’s social objective is a necessity rather than a luxury • EMU forces upon the member states : – a shared conception of labour market flexibility – symmetric guidelines on wage cost competitiveness & institutions that can deliver – long term: sustainability of pensions • Any ‘Eurozone re-insurance’ of ‘national stabilization policies presupposes (a) minimum requirements w.r.t. the adequacy of national unemployment insurance and the concomitant labour market regulation; and (b) general trust in the quality of each other’s social fabric. • The need for conceptual clarity: a European Social Union ≠ a European Welfare State A European Social Union A Social Union would • support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (e.g. stabilization, fair corporate taxation, minimum wages) • guide the substantive development of national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational definition of ‘the European social model’. ⇒ European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose, pursuing both national and pan-European social cohesion A European Pillar of Social Rights: arguments & caveats • A basic consensus about the general features of the ‘social order’ that is associated with the Monetary Union is a necessity; the EPSR can contribute to such a consensus. • Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a combination of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian background conditions and social protection, as embodied in the EPSR. • Caveat: perception of ‘replay’ of earlier soft initiatives will backlash Thank you 1) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7, European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf) 2) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) 3) Vandenbroucke, Automatic Stabilisers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Insitute, Tribune, September 2016 (www.delorsinstitute.eu) 4) Furceri, D. en A. Zdziencicka, The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism ?, IMF Working Paper 13/198, 2013 5) Beblavy, M., G. Marconi en I. Maselli, A European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The rationale and the challenges ahead, CEPS Special Report No. 119, 2015 6) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Inaugural Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 1 June 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl 7) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot UK, 2015, pp. 489-520. www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

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Presentatie_Vandenbroucke_Emeritaat_Coolsaet_16.9.2016

Europese integratie en welvaartsstaten:
tragisch dilemma?
Frank Vandenbroucke
Perspectief op een betere wereld: Colloquium naar
aanleiding van het emeritaat van Prof. dr. Rik Coolsaet
Gent, 15 september 2016
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner
met partner en twee kinderen
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden
(bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden (bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 Uitkeringen / gemiddelde inkomens Werk aan de onderkant Gezinstypes Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden (bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 Uitkeringen / gemiddelde inkomens Werk aan de onderkant Gezinstypes Migratie… drukt op onderkant arbeidsmarkt… - interne vs. externe migratie - samen met doorgeschoten flexibilisering - samen met detachering vermindert bereidheid tot herverdelen? Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten: een tragisch dilemma? • De founding fathers geloofden in… – convergentie door integratie – cohesie in de convergentie • Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000 niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten • Oorzaken? – Een tragisch dilemma? Beleidsvermogen is essentieel! – Constructiefouten in de muntunie EMU: een muntunie zonder schokdemper • Werkloosheidsverzekering wordt in muntunies centraal georganiseerd of centraal ondersteund • Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met solidariteit op het EU niveau • Piste: nationale werkloosheidsverzekeringen in EMU herverzekeren • Puzzel van: – Bindende afspraken  soevereiniteit – Wantrouwen  solidariteit – Fobie voor moral hazard, die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken Een Europese Sociale Unie Een Europese Sociale Unie: • ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, handhaving minimumlonen, belastingconcurrentie…) • oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten ligt; • op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model. ⇒ Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten ⇒ Wederkerigheid als basis om beleidsvermogen te heroveren www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl